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Abstract 
The paper presents a model of a software monopolist who benefits from a lagged network 
externality arising from consumers' feedback through the so-called bug-fixing effect. That is, 
the software producer is able to correct errors in the software code detected by previous 
users, improving her products over time. Another feature of the model is that it responds to 
the short life cycle of software products, implying time-of-purchase depending utility 
functions, which are in contrast to the usual durable goods models. Both of these 
modifications are incorporated in a standard two-periods durable goods monopoly, analysing 
questions of introductory pricing and quantity rationing. The model suggests that neither of 
these two instruments is able to explain why we see so much free software in the markets. 
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1 Introduction
Software as a good is exchanged in highly profitable and fast growing markets,
whose most striking feature is the continuous innovation brought about by
the fierce competition among producers. At the same time these markets are
also extremely segmented, and every producer who successfully introduces
a new product enjoys some monopoly power over a limited period of time,
until her competitors eventually catch up in that particular market segment,
and introduce their own, often improved, versions of the product. Innovation
and technological progress are, thus, crucial features of the software market,
and therefore the life cycle of a software product is rather short, although
it is generally considered a durable good. As a consequence the utility to
be derived from a given software product is not independent of the time of
purchase, as is usually assumed for other durable goods.
The second feature of software products that we intend to focus on is
that their quality generally improves over their life cycle, owing to the so-
called bug-fixing. The large number of users of any single software product
leads to the detection of a far larger number of errors in the code and in
the workings of the software, than any team of software designers would be
able to identify. Customers’ feedbacks are thus fundamental to the qual-
ity improvements of the early releases through patches and other bug-fixing
devices. The whole bug-fixing process generates a positive lagged network
externality which depends on the number of previous users.
Having described these characteristics of the software industry, we feel
that they are not captured well enough in the literature. Accordingly, our
aim is to develop a two-period durable goods monopoly model to represent
the software market, and to use it to investigate two issues which are well
known in the Industrial Organisation literature: introductory pricing and
quantity rationing.
One of the best known results in the field of Industrial Organisation is that
a durable goods monopolist faces the competition of her own future output.
If the monopolist cannot commit to a price sequence, she has an incentive
to lower the price after serving the consumers with the greatest willingness
to pay for the good; in so doing, though, the monopolist induces consumers
to postpone purchases. As a consequence, the no-commitment equilibrium
will exhibit declining prices. It follows that, although price discrimination
can be used in equilibrium, the static monopoly price cannot be sustained,
thus leading to a lower equilibrium profit than under precommitment1. The
existence of a lagged network externality should increase the incentives of
1On this and other issues of Industrial Organisation see, for example, Tirole [11].
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the monopolist to sell at a lower price in the first period and then reap the
benefit of the lower competition in subsequent periods. We investigate this
matter in the first part of this chapter.
An alternative approach to reduce the competition of future output could
be to serve less consumers than would be otherwise willing to buy the good
at the current price in the first period, to face higher demand in subsequent
periods. This is the idea behind quantity rationing. Indeed a typical strategy
of software companies is to give away a limited number of free beta-versions
of their products prior to the oﬃcial release to benefit form the externality
arising from bug-fixing, as mentioned above. We want to investigate if this
kind of rationing will be supported by the model. This is the object of the
second part of the paper.
The literature dealing in one way or another with these issues is huge.
We will relate to three lines of literature in the present paper. The first
line of literature refers to the possibility that the monopolist’s market power
decreases as the time between sales becomes shorter in what is known as
the Coase-conjecture. Coase [3] claimed that the price set by the monopolist
will quickly converge to marginal cost as the time between sales tends to
zero. Several contributions confirmed or refuted this conjecture in a variety of
settings. As shown by Hart and Tirole [8], though, in all cases the equilibrium
solutions obey the so-called Coasian dynamics: They satisfy the skimming
property, according to which higher valuation buyers make their purchases
no later than lower valuation ones; and the price monotonicity property,
which states that equilibrium price is non-increasing over time. Cabral et al.
[2] show that the latter does not necessarily hold in the presence of network
externalities. In particular they show that if consumers are ”large”, equilibria
can obtain in which discounted prices rise over time. If consumers are small,
to the contrary, Coasian dynamics prevail. Our task is to analyse if in the
presence of a lagged externality the software monopolist finds it profitable to
use introductory pricing.
The second line of literature to which we relate is the vast and growing
literature on network externalities. We develop our model following the ideas
of Ruiz [10] on lagged externalities, although our focus is not on innovation
and planned obsolescence but rather on pricing in this context. We think
of a software monopolist introducing a new software and then releasing free
upgrades or posting add-ons and patches on her website, to fix the bugs
discovered by the first generation of users. Clearly, the larger the number of
these first generation users, the faster and more eﬀective the feedbacks and
the bug-fixing process2.
2Ruiz [10] presents a number of diﬀerent examples also from more traditional types of
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Finally, we also relate to the literature on rationing. In the rationing lit-
erature it is common to introduce some form of precommitment to increase
the market power of the monopolist. Van Cayseele [12], for example, as-
sumes that the seller can commit to a given second-period output, so that
high-valuation consumers are not certain of obtaining the good if they post-
pone their purchases. Other models, for example Gilbert and Klemperer [6]
and Allen and Faulhaber [1], posit some kind of consumption externality or
incomplete information and, in general, assume fixed capacity. We avoid
any form of precommitment in either output or prices, assume complete in-
formation and no capacity constraints, and follow Denicolò and Garella [4]
in analysing the possibility that rationing may be profitable in a standard
durable goods monopoly model. Denicolò and Garella [4] find circumstances
where, under proportional rationing, it pays the monopolist to ration con-
sumers in the first period. Yet, we feel that in their setup the decision on
rationing, and more specifically on the scale of rationing, is not truly the
monopolist’s choice, as we will explain later on. We investigate the same
issue of rationing in a modified setup, commenting on the original results by
Denicolò and Garella.
To summarise, we will develop a simple two-periods monopoly which is
similar to the model in Denicolò and Garella [4], but diﬀers in three impor-
tant aspects: First, our utility functions are designed to better match the
special features of software products, as mentioned above. Second, we intro-
duce a lagged externality. Third, we completely endogenise the monopolist’s
decision concerning rationing. In what follows we pursue two lines of analy-
sis: In Section 2 we investigate whether, in this framework, there can obtain
equilibria with increasing discounted prices or if Coasian dynamics prevail.
As will become clear afterwards, our results confirm those in Cabral et al.
[2]. In the second part of the paper, in Section 3, we ask ourselves if the
results in Denicolò and Garella [4] remain valid also with the modified utility
functions. We find this not to be the case, indeed we show that rationing
can never be an equilibrium strategy in our modified setup.
2 The Non-Rationing Case
2.1 The Model
A monopolist sells her software product in two trading periods. The con-
sumption of the good is subject to a lagged network externality which de-
pends on the number of users in the previous period. The monopolist pro-
industry.
3
duces at constant marginal cost, which without loss of generality can be set to
zero. There is no resale market. Price commitments as well as the possibility
of renting the good are ruled out.
There is a continuum of consumers, all buying at most one unit of the
indivisible good. Consumers are indexed by their per-period utility θ for the
good. They are uniformly distributed over the interval [0, 1], with distribu-
tion function F (θ) = θ for all θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1]. This implies a linear (static)
demand function.
The sequence of actions is as follows: At the beginning of period 1, the
monopolist sets the price p1 for the current period. Consumers then decide
whether to buy the good or not. No information about the price of the good
in period 2 becomes available. In period 2 the lagged network externality
created by consumption in period 1 sets in. That is, in period 2 the monop-
olist oﬀers an improved version of the product. The monopolist sets a price
p2, and all consumers who have not bought in period 1 decide whether to
buy or not. Furthermore we assume that consumers who bought in period
1 are oﬀered a free update of the product so that they also benefit from
bug-fixing3. Letting x1 be the fraction of consumers who bought the good at
t = 1, the (positive) network externality they create is f(x1), with f
0
(x1) > 0.
For simplicity we assume it to be linear, i.e. f(x1) = ax1 with a > 04.
Let us now turn to payoﬀ functions. A consumer with valuation θ who
buys the good in period 1 earns an overall payoﬀ of
θ − p1 + δ(θ + ax1), (1)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor. A consumer who buys at t = 2 receives
δ(θ + ax1 − p2). (2)
In the standard durable goods monopoly, consumers’ payoﬀs are based on
the discounted present value of future utility. In these models, a consumer
buying at t = 1, 2 receives a payoﬀ of δt−1(θ−pt). Hence, a consumer’s valu-
ation for the good is independent of the time of purchase since the durability
of the good is assumed to be constant. The only loss from waiting for the
3Alternatively, one could assume that the monopolist opens a new market in period
2 to sell patches to period 1 consumers. This would, of course, leave some low-valuation
period 1 consumers without the patch. We find our assumption of a free upgrade more
realistic, though.
4Note that the externality is independent of the consumer’s type. In principle one could
argue that higher valuation consumers could benefit more from any given improvement.
Accordingly, one could devise a form for the externality such as, for example, g(x1, θ) =
aθx1. Again, for the sake of tractability, we will not consider externalities of this kind in
this paper.
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consumer arises from the discount factor, i.e. from her impatience. As al-
ready mentioned, we do not consider this assumption appropriate in the case
of software. We think that software does indeed ”expire” at a certain point
in time in the future due to technological progress. Therefore consumers ex-
perience an additional loss in payoﬀs by waiting: According to equations (1)
and (2), the software product expires after t = 2. A consumer buying in pe-
riod 2 not only loses payoﬀs from impatience, but also forgoes the per-period
valuation θ related to the first period. In other words, a consumer has to be
aware that by buying software tomorrow rather than today, she will face a
shorter lifetime of the product.
Finally, the payoﬀ of the monopolist is
p1x1 + δp2x2, (3)
where x2 is the demand at t = 2.
2.2 The Subgame-perfect Equilibria
The monopolist cannot commit to a price sequence, thus the relevant solution
concept is that of subgame-perfect equilibrium: We start looking for the Nash
equilibrium at the last stage of the game and proceed backwards. At the
second period, given first period output x1 and the price set by the monopolist
p2, each consumer who did not buy in the previous period will buy if p2 ≤ θ+
ax1. The marginal consumer, that is the consumer who is indiﬀerent between
buying and not buying, has a valuation θ2 = max{0, p2 − ax1}. As it is
standard in the Industrial Organisation literature, we will only consider those
subgame perfect equilibria that have exactly one indiﬀerent consumer. This
assumption implies the skimming property, i.e. higher valuation consumers
make their purchases no later than lower valuation consumers. Generally,
there can very well be more than one indiﬀerent consumer, giving rise to
subgame perfect equilibria not featuring the skimming property5.
Letting θ1 denote the valuation of the marginal consumer in period one,
it follows that θ2 ∈ [0, θ1]6. The market size in period 2 will then be
5For a discussion on this topic and on how to avoid this problem see Güth and
Ritzberger [7].
6The level of the externality will determine how much of the market the monopolist finds
optimal to cover, and thus what price to choose. In particular, the larger the externality
the higher the share of consumers that the monopolist will decide to supply with the good.
Thus the requirement that θ2 is (weakly) positive, as well as the analogous requirement
for θ1, will determine the existence of diﬀerent solutions, depending on the level of the
externality. We will present the diﬀerent cases as we proceed with the analysis.
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x2 = F (θ1)− F (θ2) = θ1 − θ2. (4)
The monopolist at t = 2 sets the price
p2 = θ2 + ax1, (5)
such that she maximises
π2 = δp2x2 = δp2[θ1 − θ2]. (6)
Depending on the size of the externality, θ2 = p2 − ax1 can be larger or
equal to zero, implying the existence of two diﬀerent cases.
We start by considering the case when the externality is not large enough
for the monopolist to cover the whole market in the second period, so that
θ2 > 0. In this case we can rewrite (6) as
π2 = δp2[θ1 − p2 + ax1]. (7)
The price set is pNR12 = argmax
{p2}
δp2[θ1 − p2 + ax1], or
p2 =
θ1 + ax1
2
, (8)
which corresponds to an output level of
x2 =
θ1 + ax1
2
, (9)
and to a second period’s profit of
πNR2 = δ
(θ1 + ax1)
2
4
. (10)
Consumers at t = 1 decide whether to buy or to wait. They will buy if
their valuation is such that
θ − p1 + δ(θ + ax1) ≥ max{0, δ[θ + ax1 − p2]}. (11)
That is, they will buy now if the payoﬀ of doing so is positive and exceeds
the payoﬀ of waiting, assuming that they perfectly foresee p2.
The marginal consumer’s valuation is derived by equalising (11) and sub-
stituting for p2, to obtain7:
θ1 =
2p1 − δax1
2 + δ
. (12)
7It is clear that in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, δ[θ1+ ax1− p2] is always positive.
Suppose to the contrary that θ1 + ax1 < p2. Substituting p2 = θ1+ax12 yields θ1 + ax1 <
θ1+ax1
2 , which contradicts. To put it in other words, the monopolist cannot commit to a
price sequence, therefore she will always maximise profits in period 2 given the residual
demand, which forces her to set p2 ≤ θ1 + ax1.
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Substituting x1 = 1− θ1 and solving for θ1 yields
θ1 =
δa− 2p1
δ(a− 1)− 2 . (13)
Finally, the monopolist sets p1 to maximise the overall non-rationing
profit
πNR1(p1) = p1
µ
1− δa− 2p1
δ(a− 1)− 2
¶
+
δ
2
µ
(1− a) δa− 2p1
δ(a− 1)− 2 + a
¶2
. (14)
Maximising πNR1(p1) gives the non-rationing equilibrium in which
pNR11 =
1
2
δ2(a− 1) + δ(2a2 − 4)− 4
δ(a2 − 1)− 4 . (15)
Substituting pNR11 in the respective equations yields
pNR12 =
1
2
δ(a− 1)− 2a− 2
δ(a2 − 1)− 4 , (16)
θNR11 =
δa2 + δa− δ − 2
δa2 − δ − 4 , (17)
θNR12 =
1
2
δa− δ − 2 + 2a+ 2δa2
δa2 − δ − 4 , (18)
πNR1 =
[4 + δ(4 + 4a+ δ)]
4 (4 + δ − δa2) . (19)
From equation (18) it is now possible to derive the bounds for a such
that θ2 is strictly positive: a ∈ [0, 14δ
³q¡
9δ2 + 20δ + 4
¢
− δ − 2
´
). For in-
troductory prices, i.e. pNR11 ≤ δpNR12 , the externality should be larger than
1
2δ
³q¡
5δ2 + 8δ
¢
− δ
´
. As it can be shown the critical value of the external-
ity is always outside of the bounds which are relevant to this case. Hence,
introductory pricing is never an optimal strategy in this case.
The second case we discuss here is the case in which θ2 = 0. The monop-
olist finds it optimal to cover the whole market in the second period.
Following the backwards induction reasoning again, we know that in the
second period the market size is x2 = θ1. Accordingly, the monopolist sets
the second period price p2 = ax1.
Consumers in period 1 decide whether to buy or to wait. They buy if
θ − p1 + δ(θ + ax1) ≥ δθ, (20)
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and for the marginal consumer in period 1 it has to be true that (substituting
x1 = 1− θ1)
θ1 − p1 + δ(θ1 + a(1− θ1)) = δθ1. (21)
Solving for θ1 yields
θ1 =
p1 − δa
1− δa . (22)
The monopolist maximises overall profits
πNR2(p1) = p1(1− (
p1 − δa
1− δa )) + δ(a(1− (
p1 − δa
1− δa )))(
p1 − δa
1− δa ), (23)
which yields
pNR21 =
1
2
δ2a2 +
1
2
. (24)
The rest of the solution is:
pNR22 =
1
2
a (1 + δa) , (25)
θNR21 =
1
2
− 1
2
δa, (26)
πNR2 =
1
4
(δa+ 1)2 . (27)
Note that for (26) to be strictly positive the externality must satisfy
a ∈ [ 1
4δ
³
−δ − 2 +
q¡
9δ2 + 20δ + 4
¢´
, 1δ ). Introductory pricing would be
optimal in this case for a value of a larger than 1δ . Once more this value lies
outside the relevant range for a and, as in the previous case, introductory
pricing cannot be an equilibrium strategy.
Finally, another possibility arises, that is the case when the externality
is so large that the monopolist finds it optimal to saturate the market in the
first period. When a ∈
£
1
δ ,+∞
¢
, the monopolist sets the price in such a
way as to make the zero valuation consumer indiﬀerent to buying or waiting,
hence pNR31 = δa and θ
NR3
1 = 0. Since then the residual demand in period
2 is zero, any p2 ≥ 0 can be part of the subgame perfect equilibrium. Intu-
itively, though, in order to prevent the marginal consumer in period 1, i.e.
the zero-valuation consumer, from postponing consumption to period 2, the
monopolist has to set the second period price p2 such that
θ1 − p1 + δ(θ1 + ax1) ≥ δ(θ1 + ax1 − p2). (28)
For p1 = δa, x1 = 1, and θ1 = 0 it has to be true that p2 ≥ a. Hence,
if the monopolist wants to ”punish” delayed consumption, she should set
8
pNR32 ≥ a, which of course necessarily leads to introductory pricing. Yet, as
already stated, pNR32 ≥ a is not a necessary condition for subgame-perfect
equilibrium, any p2 will do.
In this section we have shown that, apart from the last (degenerate) case
in which no sales take place in the second period, under no circumstances
would the monopolist find it optimal to charge increasing (discounted) prices
over time. This confirms the result obtained by Cabral et al. [2] in their
proposition 1, which states that if buyers are small and there is no uncer-
tainty, then, in no subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium can discounted prices
be rising between periods in which sales occur.
3 The Rationing Case
As already pointed out in the introduction, in a durable goods monopoly
the monopolist faces the competition of her own future output. As a conse-
quence, in the absence of precommitment prices will be lower than the static
monopoly ones and the static monopoly profit cannot be sustained. Denicolò
and Garella [4] contend that this problem could be alleviated by rationing
demand. In a two period durable goods model, consumers who have been
rationed in the first period - i.e. they were willing to buy at the given price
but they were not served - will carry their demand over to the next period.
Thus the demand functions in the second period will be increased8, reducing
the monopolist’s incentive to cut second period prices. Rational costumers
will realise this change in the incentives of the monopolist and respond by
postponing less purchases, thus improving the first period demand. The mo-
nopolist would be in a position to better discriminate between high-valuation
and low-valuation consumers, and total profit may rise. It is clear that in the
second and final period the monopolist has nothing to gain from rationing:
Rationing can only be profitable in the first period, when it can aﬀect the
future price. Denicolò and Garella in their 1999 paper [4] show that under
appropriate conditions it pays the monopolist to ration demand in the first
period, making use of a proportional rationing scheme.
Coming back to our model, we feel that given the result of Denicolò
and Garella the monopolist might have high incentives to ration period 1
consumers. Indeed, in actual markets it is common practice for software
companies to release a limited amount of free, but not fully tested versions
of their new products (the so-called beta-versions), in order to benefit from
the externality generated by user-based bug-fixing. We want to investigate
8Indeed the demand function will be kinked as shown by Denicolò and Garella [4]. In
our framework, the lagged network externality will also shift the demand function upwards.
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whether or not our model supports rationing, i.e. a strategy in which the
monopolist sets a low period 1 price p1, but does not serve all the consumers
willing to buy at that price. This strategy would allow the monopolist to
create the desired externality, but would leave a larger number of high valu-
ation consumers for period 2 consumption, therefore reducing intertemporal
competition.
We start by introducing some terminology. A rationing scheme is a func-
tion γ(θ) : Θ→ [0, 1] (where Θ is the interval of definition of the willingness
to pay θ) that determines the proportion of buyers of type θ not served in
period 1. Proportional rationing implies that γ(θ) is a constant function
in the interval θ ≥ θ1. A (time-consistent) rationing strategy is a price se-
quence (p1, p2) and a rationing function γ(θ) with
R 1
θ1 γ(θ)dF (θ) > 0, where
p2 is determined in the second period to maximise second-period profit. A
rationing equilibrium is an optimal rationing strategy that profit-dominates
the equilibrium with no rationing.
Denicolò and Garella [4] show that under proportional rationing, for γ
not too small, rationing can be an equilibrium strategy when the discount
factor is large enough. This result is the object of their proposition 2. In
what follows, our aim is to extend the framework of Denicolò and Garella
to include lagged network externalities and investigate whether their result
goes through in the modified setup. The model of this section diﬀers from
the one in the previous section in that the monopolist now sets the rationing
parameter γ together with price p1 at the beginning of period 1. That is,
she decides what fraction γ of all the consumers willing to buy the good at
price p1 she will not serve. Note that, in contrast to Denicolò and Garella,
we do not consider an exogenously given γ, but we make γ - i.e. the scale of
rationing - part of the monopolist’s decision.
3.1 Analysis
We now want to proceed with the analysis of the rationing case. We assume
that rationing is proportional, that is the monopolist only serves a fraction
1− γ of all the consumers who are willing to buy in period 1. Hence, sales
in the first period are
xR1 = (1− θ1)(1− γ). (29)
We start by showing that, when the monopolist chooses prices, and pos-
sibly also γ, such that θ1 ≥ θ2, rationing cannot pay. The argument follows
proposition 1 of [4]: The optimal sales in the rationing case can also be
achieved through non-rationing, but at a strictly higher profit. Consider the
optimal sales xR1 and x
R
2 . Since γ > 0, the monopolist has to charge a price
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pR1 that is strictly lower than the price she would charge without rationing,
in order to achieve the same amount of sales, so pNR1 > p
R
1 and therefore
θNR1 > θ
R
1 . To achieve the same volume of sales x
R
2 also in the second period,
we simply set pNR2 = p
R
2 , or equivalently θ
NR
2 = θ
R
2 , which we can do since we
hold x1 constant for both rationing and non-rationing. But then of course,
overall profits are higher when not rationing.
Therefore we only consider the complementary case when the monopolist
sets a price sequence such that θ1 < θ2. Accordingly, sales in the second
period are
xR2 = (1− θ2)γ. (30)
With γ ≥ 0, the overall profit is
πR = (1− θ1)(1− γ)pR1 + δγpR2 (1− θ2). (31)
In order to make the marginal consumers of period 1 and 2 indiﬀerent we
set
pR1 = θ1 + δ(θ1 + ax
R
1 ), (32)
and
pR2 = θ2 + ax
R
1 . (33)
Combining yields
πR = (1− θ1)(1− γ)(θ1 + δ(θ1 + a(1− θ1)(1− γ))) + (34)
+δγ(θ2 + a(1− θ1)(1− γ))(1− θ2).
As in the previous section we look for subgame-perfect equilibria. The
monopolist maximises second period profit,
δγ(θ2 + a(1− θ1)(1− γ))(1− θ2), (35)
over θ2, taking γ and θ1 as given, which yields
θR2 =
(
1−a(γ−1)(θ1−1)
2
if a < 1−2θ1
(γ−1)(θ1−1)
θ1 if a ≥ 1−2θ1(γ−1)(θ1−1)
. (36)
That is, we find an upper bound for a such that when a is within this
bound, θ2 > θ1. Note also that in this case θ
R
2 is bounded by
1
2
≥ θR2 .
In case that a exceeds the bound given in (36), θR2 = θ1 and rationing
cannot be optimal as we have already shown above. Hence, we only consider
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the case when a < 1−2θ1
(γ−1)(θ1−1) and θ
R
2 =
1−a(γ−1)(θ1−1)
2
. The corresponding
profit-maximising θ1 is
θR1 =



δaγ(aγ−a+3)+δ(2−4a)+2
δaγ(aγ+4−a)+δ(4−4a)+4 if a <
δ(4−3γ)−
√
δ(γ2δ−16γδ+16δ+8γ−8γ2)
2γδ(γ−1)
0 if a ≥ δ(4−3γ)−
√
δ(γ2δ−16γδ+16δ+8γ−8γ2)
2γδ(γ−1)
. (37)
Let us start by considering the latter case first. When θ1 = 0, the corre-
sponding θR2 is
θR2 =
1
2
+
1
2
aγ − 1
2
a. (38)
Since θ2 > θ1 = 0 we immediately obtain an upper bound a < 11−γ for
this case. Substituting (38) in the profit function (34) and maximising over
γ yields
γ =
(
2a−2−
√
(1+10a+a2)
3a
if a > 3 + 2
√
2
0 if a ≤ 3 + 2
√
2
. (39)
Replacing γ =
2a−2−
√
(1+10a+a2)
3a
in the bound a < 1
1−γ yields, after some
rearranging,
a ≤ 1−
p
(1 + 10a+ a2). (40)
Obviously, a cannot exceed 1 according to (40). But (39) requires a >
3 + 2
√
2 for γ > 0, which contradicts. Therefore, there exists no subgame-
perfect equilibrium with γ > 0 in the case when θ2 > θ1 = 0.
It remains to analyse the case of θ2 > θ1 > 0. Then the profit-maximising
γ, if a > 2(δ−
√
δ2+δ)(δ+1)
δ(δ−1) , is
γ =
δ(a(4δ−2−2δ2)−8(1+δ))+2
√
δ(δ5a2−δ4(4a+a2)+δ3(4−4a−a2)+δ2(12+a2+4a)+12δ+4δa+4)
2aδ(3δ−1) ,
and 0 otherwise.
Consider now the upper bound a < 1−2θ1γθ1+1−γ−θ1 for θ2 > θ1. Substituting
θR1 and rearranging yields
1 < δ + γ. (41)
Substituting γ into the right hand side of this inequality yields an expres-
sion that turns out to be always less than 1, which contradicts again. Hence,
also in this case there is no subgame-perfect equilibrium involving a strictly
positive γ. This completes the analysis with the result that - given our util-
ity functions and given an endogenous γ - there cannot exist any rationing
equilibrium.
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4 Conclusions
In the present paper we tackled two issues in the framework of a software
monopoly with lagged network externalities: We first confronted the pos-
sibility of the existence of an equilibrium featuring introductory prices and
subsequently turned our attention to the issue of proportional rationing as
an equilibrium strategy.
In the first part of the paper we show that introductory pricing does
not, in general, obtain. Our conclusions are in line with the results in the
first part of Cabral et al. [2], who show that, under perfect information,
unless consumers are ”large”, no subgame-perfect equilibrium can obtain in
which prices rise between periods in which sales occur. In our framework
the monopolist faces a continuum of consumers and information is perfect,
so this result appears natural. Yet we also show that for an externality large
enough the subgame-perfect price sequence leads to increasing discounted
prices over time. Such introductory pricing can only occur, though, when all
the consumers already buy in period 1, so the residual period 2 demand is
zero. In this case the externality created by consumers is so extensive that
even the consumer who would have no valuation for the good would still like
to buy immediately, foreseeing the immense improvement of the product in
period 2. This result is, anyway, an artifact of our model and is driven by our
assumption concerning the finite domain in the distribution of θ. This corner
solution would disappear if we were to assume a distribution of θ defined over
the (−∞,+∞) interval.
In the second part of the paper we show that in our model there is no
subgame-perfect equilibrium that involves rationing. The reason behind this
result is that the monopolist can always increase her profits by rationing
less; in fact the monopolist’s profit is always maximised at γ = 0, i.e. when
not rationing. Since in our model the scale of rationing is an explicit choice
variable for the monopolist, she cannot credibly commit to rationing. In a
certain sense, introducing rationing into the model moves the monopolist’s
problem of credible threats from period 2 prices to period 1 rationing. In
the standard durable goods problem, the monopolist always faces a residual
demand which she seeks to satisfy, selling to low valuation consumers at a
low price in period 2. As a consequence she cannot credibly commit to a
high period 2 price. When rationing, though, she could credibly commit to
a high period 2 price, if only she were able to commit to rationing in period
1! Yet, as she can always increase her profit by rationing less, she is always
tempted to sell to all the people willing to buy in period 1, up to the point
when she is not rationing any more. But then, of course, we are back to the
non-rationing case.
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This result hinges crucially on the incorporation of the rationing para-
meter into the monopolist’s decision, but neither on the lagged externality
nor on the specific form of the payoﬀ functions. It is straightforward to see
that also in a standard durable goods monopoly, as in Denicolò and Garella
[4], once γ becomes part of the monopolist’s choice variables, the same result
obtains: The monopolist’s profit under rationing is maximised when γ = 0.
In contrast to our model, Denicolò and Garella derive a necessary condi-
tion for the rationing parameter γ such that i) rationing profit-dominates
non-rationing; and ii) the monopolist has no incentives to set p2 such that
θ2 < θ1. The monopolist’s decision is then to decide between not rationing
and rationing at a given scale. They show that for a discount factor large
enough the monopolist will choose to ration in equilibrium. An exogenously
given γ, though, completely ignores the monopolist’s incentives to reduce
rationing in the first period to increase her profits.
Naturally the question arises if such a γ under which rationing profit-
dominates non-rationing exists in our model. We were not able to find such
a γ, but we could not derive this result analytically due to the complexity
of the model. So this result constitutes a conjecture, and it stems from the
time-of-purchase depending payoﬀ functions9. Hence, in our model not only
is rationing not subgame-perfect, in fact rationing never pays the monopolist
in the sense of Denicolò and Garella. The reason for this becomes clear
when reconsidering payoﬀ functions (1) and (2). By postponing consumers’
purchases from period 1 to period 2 through rationing, consumers lose their
first-period valuation for the good. The monopolist, then, cannot charge for
this lost valuation, hence she loses some of the consumer’s willingness-to-pay
for the good. Consequently, she has to considerably cut down the price in
period 2. The monopolist can obviously not recoup this loss by reducing
intertemporal competition.
The model we presented is in many aspects a very simple one, as we
were driven in our modelling choices by the willingness to obtain tractable
closed form solutions. Several extensions are, of course, possible. In the
paper we already suggested that the first and most straightforward extensions
should certainly concern the domain of the distribution of consumers and a
more general, possibly consumer-depending, functional form for the lagged
externality. These two changes would increase the degree of generality of the
model while further specialising it to better fit the software market’s features.
At the end of this paper, we can say that the question of why we see so
9Calculating the model with the standard durable goods payoﬀ functions plus a lagged
externality, we were able to find such a γ, so the result is due to the alternative payoﬀ
functions and not to the externality.
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much free software in the markets remains open. A large body of literature
is forming on this issue and more generally on the behaviour of monopolists
operating in markets characterised by fast obsolescence of ”durable” goods,
and many interesting, alternative answers are currently under investigation.
Yet, we feel that we have indeed made a contribution, as we believe that
the results discussed in this paper imply that, whatever the answer to that
question, neither introductory pricing nor quantity rationing are the right
candidates.
References
[1] Allen, F. and Faulhaber, G.R. [1991] ”Rational Rationing”, Economica,
58:189-98.
[2] Cabral, L.M.B., Salant, D.J. and Woroch, G.A. [1999] ”Monopoly Pric-
ing with Network Externalities”, International Journal of Industrial Or-
ganization, 17:199-214.
[3] Coase, R. [1972] ”Durability and Monopoly”, Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 15:143-149.
[4] Denicolò, V. and Garella, P.G. [1999] ”Rationing in a Durable Goods
Monopoly”, RAND Journal of Economics, 30(1):44-55.
[5] Fundenberg, D. and Tirole, J. [1991] Game Theory. Cambridge, Mass.:
The MIT Press.
[6] Gilbert, R.J. and Klemperer, P. [2000] ”An Equilibrium Theory of Ra-
tioning”, RAND Journal of Economics, 31(1):1-21.
[7] Güth, W. and Ritzberger, K. [1998] ”On Durable Goods Monopolies
and the Coase-Conjecture”, Review of Economic Design, 3(3):215-236.
[8] Hart, O.D. and Tirole, J. [1988] ”Contract Renegotiation and Coasian
Dynamics”, The Review of Economic Studies, 55(4):509-540.
[9] Ritzberger, K. [2002] Foundations of Non-Cooperative Game Theory.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[10] Ruiz, J.M. [2001] ”Another Perspective on Planned Obsolescence: Is
there really too much Innovation?”, mimeo.
15
[11] Tirole, J. [1988] The Theory of Industrial Organization, Cambridge,
Mass.: The MIT Press.
[12] Van Cayseele, P. [1991] ”Consumer Rationing and the Possibility
of Intertemporal Price Discrimination”, European Economic Review,
35:1473-84.
16
  
Authors: Corrado Di Maria, Johannes Köttl  
 
Title:  Lagged Network Externalities and Rationing in a Software Monopoly 
 
Reihe Ökonomie / Economics Series 120 
 
Editor: Robert M. Kunst (Econometrics) 
Associate Editors: Walter Fisher (Macroeconomics), Klaus Ritzberger (Microeconomics)  
 
ISSN: 1605-7996 
© 2002 by the Department of Economics and Finance, Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), 
Stumpergasse 56, A-1060 Vienna · ( +43 1 59991-0 · Fax +43 1 59991-555 · http://www.ihs.ac.at  
 
 ISSN: 1605-7996 
 
